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A TALE OF Two NETWORKS: TERRORISM,
TRANSNATIONAL LAW, AND NETWORK THEORY
Christopher J. Borgen*
1. INTRODUCTION
Talk of networks and "network theory" has become almost
ubiquitous in the field of counterterrorism. Terrorist organizations are
networks. Terrorists have been empowered by the Internet, ethnic
diasporas, and cellphones-networks all.' Many of the putative targets
of terrorists-electrical grids, oil pipelines, and transportation systems, to
name a few-are themselves networks. And, perhaps less often
mentioned, terrorists are increasingly hampered by national and
international laws that foster cooperation and coordination among
states-a network of laws.
From "smart mobs" to "netwars," from narcotrafficking to the
Internet, network theory has provided insights into decentralized social
organizations and their coordinated action. Both sides in the "War on
Terror" are networked and are themselves networks. This essay is the
tale of two networks: what happens when the network of terror and the
network of law collide.
Part II will briefly introduce the network theory and use it to describe
the mechanisms of al Qaeda's terror network. Part III will turn to how
network theory has affected counterterrorism strategy, particularly
emphasizing intelligence analysis and the use of legal regimes to
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Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. I am especially indebted to conference
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leverage strengths. Part IV will return to network theory more broadly
and ask how the network of law can be adjusted to be more effective in
disrupting the terrorists' network. This essay concludes that, despite the
hostility of the Bush Administration to international law and that
Administrations' efforts to circumvent existing domestic legal regimes,
the network of domestic and international laws, including the protection
of civil liberties, is a crucial component to a successful counterterrorism
strategy.
II. THE NETWORK OF TERROR AND FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE
A. Constructing Terror Networks
Since September 11, al Qaeda-a relative newcomer as far as
terrorist groups are concerned-has become the center of attention in the
global conflict against terrorist organizations. For the American public,
it has become symbolic of the people and groups who would strike at the
United States. But for other would-be terrorists, al Qaeda's successes on
September 11 have provided a lesson about organization, strategy, and
tactics.2 Al Qaeda provides us with an example of how violent
organizations such as terrorist groups, separatist movements, and gangs
are evolving and adapting.
Prior to September 11, al Qaeda was organized much like other older
terrorist groups, using a "hub-and-spokes" design with Osama bin Laden
and his close advisors at the center, and ties going out to operational cells
at the end of the spokes.3 However, since the War in Afghanistan
disrupted the hub-and-spokes architecture, al Qaeda has reorganized
itself by using cells made up of individuals who all know each other
(known in network theory as "all-channel connectivity"), and each cell
may know one or two people in one or two other cells.4 Thus, there are
2. Id. at 139.
3. See David Ronfeldt, Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging
Segmental Warfare, in INFORMATION STRATEGY AND WARFARE: A GUIDE TO THEORY AND
PRACTICE 35, 35 (John Arquilla & Douglas A. Borer eds., 2007), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2008/RAND_RP 1371.pdf (noting that, due to outside
pressure, al Qaeda may have for a time shifted from its original hub-and-spokes design to
a scattered cluster design, but as of 2007 it may have evolved into a multi-hub network).
4. See John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Revisited), in
NETWORKS AND NETWARS: THE FUTURE OF TERROR, CRIME AND MILITANCY 9 (John
Arquilla & David Ronfeldt eds., 2001) (stating al Qaeda now has "a more distributed
design characterized by dispersed small zones of all-channel connectivity linked loosely
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areas of high connectivity, each of which is linked to one or two other
such areas of high connectivity. This is sometimes referred to as a
"scattered-cluster design." 5
Such an architecture frustrates traditional methods of law
enforcement and military strategy. For example, when law enforcement
was arrayed against traditionally hierarchical organizations such as Mafia
crime families, the police usually could identify the leadership of the
criminal enterprise. There, the problem usually turned on connecting a
specific group of leaders to certain crimes. However, but for certain
well-known figures such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, al
Qaeda-type networks are usually run by "relative unknowns.' 6 Thus,
what we often call "al Qaeda" is not really one organization with one
command structure; it is a swarm of small organizations that cooperate
when it is advantageous to do so.7 Similarly, the insurgency in Iraq has
been described as being comprised of "seventy-five to one hundred
small, diverse, and autonomous groups."8
Moreover, these organizations learn from each other. Innovations
that work are replicated, while those that fail are either set aside or
tinkered with until they are useful. It is a "bazaar of violence," as
exemplified in Iraq, where information and resources are bought, sold,
and shared, but the bazaar is going global. 9 Tactics that are being tested
in the streets of Baghdad are being imported to operations in Europe and
elsewhere.' 0 Groups are cognizant of each others' innovations. One can
find American neo-Nazis opining on the lessons al Qaeda has learned
about network-based operations."
Thus, while al Qaeda itself may not be as dangerous as it once was,
the other organizations that it inspires have become more dangerous.
Even if, or when, al Qaeda is destroyed, this new mode of conflict will
by chains").
5. Id.
6. ROBB, supranote 1, at 139.
7. See id. at 4.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 15-16.
10. John Sullivan, Policing Networked Diasporas, SMALL WARS J., July 9, 2007,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/07/print/policing-networked-diasporas/.
11. William Crotty, International Terrorism: Causes and Consequences for a
Democratic Society, in DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 523, 524 (William Crotty ed., 2005) (quoting Jessica Stern
describing a discussion with a neo-Nazi).
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remain with US. 12 And so, it is important to not only focus on al Qaeda as
an organization, but also on what al Qaeda heralds about armed conflict.
B. Network as Strategy: Fourth Generation Warfare
There is little doubt that the nature of armed conflict is changing in
profound ways. Some call the period we are entering the "fourth
generation" of warfare ("4GW"), a term that was defined in a seminal
article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989,"3 and was recently
reconsidered by John Robb in his book Brave New War.' 4 By this
nomenclature, the mass warfare exemplified by the Napoleonic Wars is
considered the first generation.' 5 The Industrial Revolution spurred the
second generation, which was typified by the harnessing of entire
economies to produce war materiel and which reached its peak in the
deployment of new weapons systems in World War J16 The third
generation was a reaction to the second, and was based on new strategies
of maneuver warfare. 17 This generation was fully realized in World War
II with the use of the blitzkrieg.'8 The Cold War was typified by fears of
Russian tanks storming through the Fulda Gap. The laws of armed
conflict shifted and adapted in each of these instances to respond to the
new ways that war was fought. But in each case, the change in law was
an attempt to curb the worst proclivities, not enable them.
The rise of nuclear weapons made it difficult for states to fight each
other without running the risk of mutual annihilation. 19 This, in turn,
caused states to turn to low-intensity conflict and proxy wars. ° Such
"small wars," combined with the advent of cheap and powerful
computers and global communication, has heralded 4GW. This is an era
of "super-empowered" individuals who are able to act in a manner -for
12. See Lisa J. Campbell, Applying Order-of-Battle to Al Qaeda Operations, in
NETWORKS, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL INSURGENCY 129, 132 (Robert J. Bunker ed., 2005).
13. William S. Lind et al., The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,
MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, Oct. 1989, at 22, 22-26, available at http://www.d-n-
i.net/fcs/4thgen war gazette.htm.
14. ROBB, supra note 1.
15. Lind et al., supra note 13.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 194 (1991).
20. Id.
[Vol. 33,
A Tale of Two Networks
good or evil-that formerly had been the preserve of states. 21 Future
wars by groups "we today call terrorists, guerillas, bandits, and robbers"
will be organized along "charismatic lines" of individual leadership as
opposed to the formal bureaucracy of the modem state.22
The same forces of globalization that have transformed how
governments and businesses operate are also transforming violent
criminal groups. The Information Revolution has also revolutionized the
organization and the use of force. On one level, the Internet simply
makes it easier to find information, equipment, and recruits.23 The
Internet also allows violence to be commanded via remote control; for
example, there are jihadi websites from which viewers can watch (via
webcam) and detonate with the click of a button actual bombs in the
streets of Baghdad.24 Besides the connectivity of the World Wide Web,
ever greater levels of computing power have been commodified: a
modified Playstation 2 game console has the ability to control a missile
25to target. Home videogames have gone from Missile Command to
commanding missiles. Advances in other areas of technology could be
similarly exploited by terrorists; for example, advanced fermenting
equipment can be used to manufacture biological weapons. 26 These are
but two examples of the "decentralization of the tools of warfare. 27
Advances in communications have also facilitated an evolution in
how terrorists organize themselves. By and large, terrorist organizations
are no longer top-down hierarchies. 28 They are decentralized networks, a
web of relationships linking "nodes" (which may be individuals, cells,
organizations, states, and other networks).29  Each "node" can serve
different functions (such as fund raising, organizing, or executing a plan)
for different operations. Decentralization means that nodes do not
generally wait for orders but are entrepreneurial in finding targets of
opportunity and organizing the resources needed for a particular
21. ROBB, supra note 1, at 27, 30.
22. CREVELD, supra note 19, at 197.
23. JESSICA STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS 10 (1999).
24. See, e.g., 'Wired For War' Explores Robots On The Battlefield, NPR, Jan. 22,
2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=99663723.
25. ROBB, supra note 1, at 9.
26. STERN, supra note 23, at 10.
27. ROBB, supra note 1, at 74.
28. See, e.g., CHARLES PE&A, WINNING THE UN-WAR: A NEW STRATEGY FOR THE WAR
ON TERRORISM 107 (2006).
29. See id. (describing the nodes of al Qaeda's network as being individual operatives,
terrorist cells, and states).
20081
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operation.
Moreover, as exemplified in Iraq, different nodes from within a
terrorist network learn from each others' experiences, and different
terrorist networks learn from each other. Such "open-source warfare...
starts with a plausible promise," such as "we will hamper the U.S.
invaders," and then shares "tactics, weapons, strategies, target selection,
planning methods, and team dynamics," which are all open to
community improvement.30  Improvised Explosive Devices, better
known as "IEDs," are an example of development via such open-source
warfare.3'
These various developments in organized violence-the ability to
trigger violence at a distance, the commodification of computing power,
the expansion of communication capabilities, the shift from hierarchical
to networked organization, and the sharing and improvement of tactics
and technology, are combined with an older strategy of irregular warfare:
"to waste the strength of the strong-to bleed the target state dry morally
and economically." 32  Targeting the state economically is linked to
striking at the legitimacy of the state.33 As the energy, security, and
communications systems of a state are repeatedly disrupted, the bonds of
social cohesion fray and break. Ayman al Zawahiri has said that al
Qaeda will "'provoke and bait' the United States into 'bleeding wars' on
Muslim lands," ultimately causing the people of the United States to lose
the will to fight and cause the United States to pull out of Muslim
countries.34 Put another way, "when the strong fight the weak, they
become weak., 35 Moreover, as Martin van Creveld argues, "he who
fights terrorists for any period of time is likely to become one himself."
36
C. Describing Terrorist Networks
With these general observations about 4GW as background, the
focus can turn to describing the parts of a terrorist network. The three
30. ROBB, supra note 1, at 116.
31. Id. at 135.
32. Id. at 27.
33. Id. at 5; see also Robert J. Bunker, Introduction and Overview: Why Response
Networks?, in NETWORKS, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL INSURGENCY, supra note 12, at 1,2.
34. Philip H. Gordon, Can the War on Terror Be Won?, 86 FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec.
2007, at 53, 57.
35. ROBB, supra note 1, at 28.
36. Id. at 201.
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main types of actors are states, transnational groups or networks, and
individuals. In addition, each of the types of actors can play one or more
of three basic roles: leader, supporter, and footsoldier.
i. Actors
Individuals. Perhaps the most common mental image one has of a
terrorist network is of a loose organization made up of individuals. What
is important to emphasize in 4GW, though, is that because terrorism does
not necessarily require large amounts of funding to have a large impact,
individuals are more powerful than ever.37 At times, individuals can act
in a manner that had previously been the preserve of states. Such
"superempowered individuals," to use Thomas Friedman's term, are able
to use new technologies to prosecute old hatreds or ambitions.38
States. Although many policymakers speak of "state-sponsored"
terrorism as if it is a single thing, there is actually a continuum of
different types of state sponsorship ranging from active control to a mere
coincidence of interests between state and terrorist.39 Some states may
act as sponsors of specific acts of terrorism through financial assistance,
arms transfers, the provision of intelligence, etc.4 ° Iran's relationship
with Hezbollah is one such example. States can also act as a node in a
terrorist network by providing safe harbor or a hideout for terrorists.
41
Afghanistan's relationship with al Qaeda prior to September 11 is the
most commonly cited example. Moreover, states can play an inadvertent
role in terrorist networks when failed states act as recruiting grounds or
sites for organization. Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo are among failed states that could
play such roles for various networks.42
37. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 13 (1999) (regarding
the increase in power of individuals).
38. Id.
39. Neal A. Pollard, Globalization's Bastards: Illegitimate Non-State Actors in
International Law, in NETWORKS, TERRORISM AND GLOBAL INSURGENCY, supra note 12,
at 40, 62-63.
40. See OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2007 171 (2008), http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/105904.pdf.
41. See, e.g., id. ("Iran and Syria routinely provided safe haven ...to terrorist
organizations.").
42. Robert I. Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, in THE BATTLE FOR
HEARTS AND MINDS: USING SOFT POWER TO UNDERMINE TERRORIST NETWORKS 79, 86
(Alexander T.J. Lennon ed., 2003).
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Transnational groups or networks. One insight into networks is that
one network can actually act as a node in another network.43 Regarding
jihadist terrorist networks, diaspora communities in western states can be
useful in providing a source for recruitment as well as a comfortable base
of operations for extremist cells. 44
ii. Roles
The various actors can play different roles in the pursuit of a terrorist
enterprise. Thus, a single actor can play multiple roles, or only one.
Leaders. Although terrorist networks find willing recruits among the
poor and marginalized, many terrorists, especially among the leadership,
are well-educated and socio-economically advantaged.45  For example,
Omar Sheikh, believed to have masterminded the killing of Danny Pearl,
has a personal wealth of $800,000.46 Mohammad Atta, the operational
commander of the September 11 attacks, was from an upper-middle-class
family.
Using al Qaeda's structure as a model, terrorist networks can be
described as having three levels of leadership: strategic planners,
regional leaders, and tactical commanders.47
Supporters. Supporters provide logistical and financial support to
the leaders and footsoldiers who actually undertake acts of violence and
disruption. They can be individual "money men" like Bin Laden, states
such as Iran, or charitable organizations. Charity to the poor is one of the
central pillars of Islam and is known as "zakat. '' 48 Unfortunately, zakat
can be exploited by terrorist networks that divert funds given to a myriad
of legitimate charity groups to terrorist operations.49 Moreover, the
network of informal financial transfer sites, or hawallas, throughout the
Muslim world and diaspora provide a means to move large sums of
money via small, largely undocumented transfers.5
43. See PERA, supra note 28, at 108 (describing al Qaeda as a "network of networks").
44. Sullivan, supra note 10.
45. Irm Haleem, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia: Recruiting Grounds for
Terrorism?, in DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 121, 129.
46. Id.
47. MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, CRUSH THE CELL: HOW To DEFEAT TERRORISM WITHOUT
TERRORIZING OURSELVES 54 (2008).
48. Haleem, supra note 45, at 133.
49. Id.
50. See Rachana Pathak, Note, The Obstacles to Regulating the Hawala: A Cultural
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Footsoldiers. The tip of terrorism's spear is the footsoldier, the
person who carries out an attack, sets a bomb, and so on. Sometimes,
footsoldiers are not closely tied to the leaders or supporters. 5' Then-
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, in testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that bin Laden's
organization and other terror groups are "plac[ing] emphasis on
developing surrogates to carry out attacks. 52 Once again using al Qaeda
as an example, it
seems to have relatively few senior leaders, a greater number of
highly trained lieutenants, anywhere from 50,000 to 70,000
trained foot soldiers from its camps in Sudan and Afghanistan,
and an indeterminate (but increasing) number of relatively
untrained volunteers like Richard Reed, Jose Padillo [sic], and an
unknown number of recruits in Iraq. 3
Counterterrorism strategy can be aimed at one or more of these
various actors or the roles that they play. However, experience has
shown that leadership is a key asset. Network theory posits that leaders
that are gateways for different parts of the network to access each other
(for example, the financial backers who supply money and the operatives
who spend money) are particularly important nodes in a network. Thus,
as one expert explained, "while a decentralized network is more robust
than a centralized one, it can still be destroyed (or severely degraded) if
enough of the individual leadership nodes are eliminated such that cells
of the organization are not effectively connected. ' ' 54  Besides key
connections, some nodes possess skill sets that are difficult for terrorists
to replace. As Michael Sheehan, the former Deputy Commissioner for
Counterterrorism of the New York Police Department, explains,
"[r]adical hotheads are easy to find, and plots to attack the United States
are even more plentiful. But it takes a special person-with the right
Norm or a Terrorist Hotbed?, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2007, 2009-10, 2018, 2026-27
(2004).
51. See, e.g., ROBB, supra note 1, at 137.
52. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 4 (2001) (prepared statement of
George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency), available at https:l/
www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/pub-statements-terrorism.html.
53. David P. Auerswald, Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks, 121 POL. SC. Q. 543, 550
(2006).
54. PE&A, supra note 28, at 102.
2008]
Oklahoma City University Law Review
measure of ideological fervor, discipline, and leadership ability-to
organize a small group to assemble a bomb and conduct an attack. '55 In
short, "[r]adical dreamers ... are a dime a dozen in al Qaeda. A tactical
leader such as Atta is their single most important asset."
56
D. Implications for U.S. Policy
This description of the structure of al Qaeda, along with the insights
of network theory, leads to certain implications for U.S. counterterrorism
policy. "[Pjrior to 9/11, the response to [terrorist] attacks was basically
defensive. The U.S. government posed the question 'How can we keep
bombers away from our barracks and embassies?' instead of 'How can
we crush the terrorists' capability to organize these attacks?"'' 57 In short,
"good defenses do help protect targets, but if you don't crush the cell, the
terrorists will find another target., 58 Towards this goal, we particularly
want to deplete al Qaeda and similar terrorist networks of their tactical
commanders.
One of the core ideas in this essay is that "a strategic principle for the
network age [is that] the advisable way to out-compete is to out-
cooperate., 59 Absent some level of cooperation, national bureaucracies
are unlikely to be effective against transnational terrorist networks.6 °
This is true regarding both military power and law enforcement.
This leads to various implications for U.S. foreign policy. First of
all, a simple military assault alone will not be enough to destroy a
decentralized network. Moreover, the threat of military force is unlikely
to prevent future terrorist attacks. 61 David Auerswald describes the two
types of deterrence policy, which are deterrence by denial and deterrence
by punishment. "[D]eterrence by denial uses the threat of defeat to
prevent the attack before it occurs. ... Deterrence by punishment is a
difficult but possible strategy against nonstate actors. It requires
55. SHEEHAN, supra note 47, at 48.
56. Id. at 49.
57. Id. at 18.
58. Id. at 50.
59. Arquilla & Ronfeldt, supra note 4, at 14.
60. Id. at 14-15.
61. See SHEEHAN, supra note 47, at 4; see also Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz,
Beyond the "War" on Terrorism: Towards the New Intelligence Network, 103 MICH. L.
REv. 1446, 1448 (book review) (paraphrasing Phillip Heymann's observation that "[t]he
United States ... faces a series of different enemies, who are not likely to be eliminated
or even diminished by deployment of traditional military forces").
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retaiate,,62convincing signals that we could identify whom to retaliate against.
But modem terrorist networks are mobile, with little permanent
infrastructure. While some nodes may actually be states, such as
Afghanistan when it provided a safe-haven, the invasion of a particular
state may force the network to reorganize like a flock of birds changing
direction; but it is unlikely to destroy the whole network.
While military force is part of an effective counterterrorism strategy,
it is not the key to such a strategy. As one commentator put it, "[i]f [our
leaders] fall prey to the illusion that this is World War III-and that it
can be won like a traditional war-they risk perpetuating the conflict.
'
"
63
More often than military deployments, combating transnational terror
networks will require complex intelligence and law enforcement
operations. Effectively cracking down on al Qaeda requires targeting
domestic terrorism in various states to make it difficult for al Qaeda to
find bases of support.64 The goal is to collapse the network by striking at
crucial nodes and linkages. Random arrests are ineffective as "[a]
significant fraction of nodes [in a highly connected network] can be
randomly removed without much impact on [the network's] integrity. 65
As Michael Sheehan explains, "[u]ndercover agents, informant networks,
and phone and e-mail intercepts are the most effective weapons we
have. 66 And they will need to be used to find the operational leaders
and the people who are the communication hubs from one cell to
another.67
Thus, governments are fighting the network of terrorism by building
their own networks, and focusing on collapsing terrorist networks.68
Even in the case of military force, coordination and cooperation amongst
allies is key. U.S. special operators are "most successful when they
operate in partnership with local forces. 69
Network theory has not only revolutionized terrorist organizations,
but anti-terrorist efforts as well. Two key examples are the revolution in
intelligence-analysis techniques and the evolution of transnational legal
62. Auerswald, supra note 53, at 547.
63. Gordon, supra note 34, at 65.
64. Haleem, supra note 45, at 140.
65. MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 140 (2004).
66. SHEEHAN, supra note 47, at 4.
67. SAGEMAN, supra note 65, at 141.
68. Arquilla & Ronfeldt, supra note 4, at 13.
69. SHEEHAN, supra note 47, at 110.
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regimes meant to foster cooperation and coordination.7 °
III. THE COUNTERTERRORISM NETWORKS AND THE RULE OF LAW
The intelligence community is not generally known for the
widespread sharing of information among different spy agencies. The
various intelligence agencies within the U.S. intelligence community
have been criticized-especially in the months following September
11-for being too parochial, and for "stovepiping" intelligence vertically
in their own agencies without the benefit of insight, critique, or
additional intelligence from other agencies.71 Since September 11, the
emphasis has been on turning the intelligence community from a row of
stovepipes into an interactive network.
A. The Intelligence Network
As the U.S. intelligence community learned more about how al
Qaeda planned and executed attacks, it reconsidered how the intelligence
community itself was organized:
Al Qaeda operatives organized their plots in a hivelike fashion,
with collaborators from Afghanistan to London using e-mail,
instant messaging and Yahoo groups; rarely did a single
mastermind run the show. To disrupt these new plots, some
intelligence officials concluded, American agents and analysts
would need to cooperate just as fluidly-trading tips quickly
among agents and agencies. Following the usual chain of
command could be fatal. "To fight a network like Al Qaeda, you
need to behave like a network," John Arquilla, the influential
professor of defense at the Naval Postgraduate School, [said].72
For example, responding to the risks posed by extremist cells within
diaspora communities requires counterterrorism policies that "build upon
community policing and develop the cultural understanding and
70. For a consideration of cross-border governmental and bureaucratic networks, see
generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
71. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 408 (2004).
72. Clive Thompson, Open-Source Spying, N.Y TIMES MAG., Dec. 3, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03/magazine/03intelligence.html.
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community trust required to recognize the emergence of extremist cells,
radicalization, efforts to recruit terrorists, and efforts to exploit criminal
enterprises or gangs to further terrorist activities. 73  Network theory
shows us that diaspora communities must not be treated as impenetrable
enclaves. If they were, then they would become useful nodes for a terror
network, promising both anonymity and resources. However, if the state
develops policies to incorporate those communities into the broader civil
society, they can become part of the network of counterterrorism. Of
course, one must keep in mind that, to a certain extent, some of these
communities want to be separate in order to maintain and foster
particular cultural practices. It is not suggested that that be changed.
What is important, though, is to build links with these communities to
strengthen the understanding that security is a mutual concern and that
cooperating on issues of security in no way affects the communities'
ability to practice their culture.
The Bush Administration's use of network theory in the gathering of
intelligence-from data mining to widening the use of wiretaps to John
Poindexter's "Total Information Awareness"-has been well
documented elsewhere. The goal is to generate enough data through
travel patterns, call and e-mail intercepts, financial transactions, and so
on, for analysis that would show linkages between people and expose
hidden networks. Such network mapping may display chimeras-
linkages and persons with very close degrees of separation, but who are
not actually part of an actual network. The hope is that it will also
uncover cells via their behavior and associations.
The civil liberties issues of some of these tactics-such as lowering
the bar on wiretapping and data mining the activities of people who have
not even been suspected of any crime-are significant. However, these
issues have been well analyzed elsewhere and are beyond the scope of
this short essay. Rather, this essay will turn to another aspect of network
theory in the intelligence community-how networks are changing and
how information is distributed and organized among intelligence
analysts.
As one commentator explained, "[t]he most valuable spy system is
one that can quickly assemble disparate pieces that are already lying
around-information gathered by doctors, aid workers, police officers or
security guards at corporations. 74  Keeping with the norm of
73. Sullivan, supra note 10.
74. Thompson, supra note 72.
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stovepiping, the computer systems of the various intelligence agencies
could share information only within their proper agency, but not across
agencies.75 According to Dale Meyerrose, the former Chief Information
Officer for the Director of National Intelligence, "'We've had this 'need
to know' culture for years .... Well, we need to move to a 'need to
share' philosophy. ,,
76
The move from stovepiped analysis to networked analysis is being
facilitated by "web 2.0" tools such as collaborative reference works,
blogs, and social-networking programs." Such collaborative
technologies facilitate rapid accretion and revision of information. To
take an example from outside the intelligence community, Wikipedia had
a page online about the London transit-system bombings "barely minutes
after the attacks., 78 The CIA has started its own collaborative reference,
"Intellipedia," which allows analysts with adequate security clearance to
log in and contribute to entries on different topics of research and
analysis.79 Intellipedia has grown from 20,000 registered users in July
2007 to over 35,000 users in July 2008.80 It has approximately 48,000
article pages and has received approximately 1.6 million edits.8"
The CIA has also been impressed by the use of blogs to disseminate
information and foster discussion among people who normally would not
be interlocutors. One CIA blog concerning the avian flu was so
successful that it became the Administration's most important resource
82
on that issue.
The intelligence community is even getting its own version of the
popular social-networking site, Facebook.8 3 Called A-Space, it allows
communication and networking among analysts in the nation's sixteen
intelligence agencies. Michael Wertheimer, the Assistant Deputy
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Central Intelligence Agency, Intellipedia Marks Second Anniversary,
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/intellipedia-marks-second-
anniversary.html; see also D. Calvin Andrus, Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence
Community: The Wiki and the Blog, 49 STUDS. IN INTELLIGENCE, 2005, https://
www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol49no3/html files/index.html.
78. Thompson, supra note 72.
79. Id.
80. Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 77.
81. Id.
82. Thompson, supra note 72.
83. Larry Shaughnessy, CIA, FBIpush 'Facebookfor spies', CNN.coM, Sept. 5, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/ptech/09/05/facebook.spies/index.html.
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Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, explains that, "'It's a
place where not only spies can meet but share data they've never been
able to share before .... This is going to give them for the first time a
chance to think out loud, think in public amongst their peers, under the
protection of an A-Space umbrella."'
84
These tools attempt to facilitate the accumulation of information and
collaboration in its analysis by breaking down hierarchies and fostering
interconnection within a large population of analysts. 85 In this sense,
information networks have different practical effects than terror
networks. Terror networks compartmentalize in order to make it difficult
to "crash" the whole network. By contrast, analytical networks are
meant to open access across most or all of the network in order to have
as large a group as possible working on any one problem.
However, the fact that these tools build a massively interconnected
network is also their greatest weakness. As blogs, wikis, and social-
networking sites allow many people to see and edit the same information,
should a hacker enter the network, they would have the same wide-
ranging access. Even without positing that a hacker may get into the
system, such web 2.0 tools risk exposing intelligence sources to analysts
who may be willing to sell what they know to other parties (or just do so
accidentally).86 The implementers of these new technologies are aware
of these risks, and thus plan to undertake network analysis of their own
networks:
The creators of A-Space do not want it to be used by some future
double agent such as Jonathan Pollard or Robert Hanssen to steal
America's 21 st-century secrets.
"We're building [a] mechanism to alert that behavior. We
call that, for lack of a better term, the MasterCard, where
someone is using their credit card in a way they've never used it
before, and it alerts so that maybe that credit card has been
stolen," Wertheimer said. "Same thing here. We're going to
actually do patterns on the way people use A-Space." 87
There are two serious concerns about the move towards networked
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Thompson, supra note 72.
87. Shaughnessy, supra note 83.
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information and analysis in the intelligence community. The first is that
the culture of the intelligence agencies-and particularly issues of career
advancement-are an impediment to some of these innovations. The
ability of an analyst-and their prospect for promotion-"'is judged by
[their] reports. And that gets in the way of developing knowledge
socially, where it becomes very difficult to know who added or revised
what.,,,8
The second concern is that the sharing of information poses its own
civil liberties problems. As David Weinberger of Harvard's Berkman
Center said, "'I don't want the N.S.A. passing on information about
innocent Americans to local cops in San Diego .... Those laws exist for
good reasons.'
89
This brings us to the other main counterterrorism network for our
consideration, the network of law.
B. Law's Network
While some who seek new techniques of counterterrorism treat the
law and civil liberties as at best irrelevant, or at worst an impediment to
an effective national security strategy, the law is actually one of the first
places where network theory affected counterterrorism efforts. The
network of domestic and international laws aimed at foiling terrorism,
and also at protecting civil liberties, has never been more relevant.
The web of domestic and international law, also called transnational
law,90 has three major functions in the struggle against terrorism: (a) it
allows for a united front by coordinating anti-terrorism laws and
88. Thompson, supra note 72.
89. Id.
90. "Transnational law" is a term coined by Phillip Jessup "to include all law which
regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private
international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such
standard categories." PHILLIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956). Jessup viewed
this law as encompassing relations between states, relations between individuals, and
relations between states and individuals; he wanted a term which would identify "the law
applicable to the complex interrelated world community which may be described as
beginning with the individual and reaching on up to the so-called 'family of nations' or
'society of states."' Id. at 1. Anne-Marie Slaughter has chosen a narrower definition,
setting the bounds of transnational law as "all municipal law and a subset of
intergovernmental agreements that directly regulate transnational activity between
individuals and between individuals and state governments." Anne-Marie Slaughter
Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 205, 230 (1993).
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regulatory frameworks; 91 (b) it provides laws and litigation regimes that
facilitate enforcement of those anti-terrorism laws; and (c) it allows rule-
of-law programs in transitional countries to assist social stability and
play a part in making it more difficult to recruit new footsoldiers. The
first two of these roles are considered in this essay, as they are closely
related to each other. The function of rule-of-law programs as a
component in counterterrorism is an important question, and one that has
been under-explored. However, it is in need of a longer analysis in a
separate article and is beyond the scope of the task at hand.
Law's network is, as a first step, a network of treaties providing a
(nearly) uniform set of basic characteristics among the main anti-
terrorism treaties. The main anti-terrorism conventions include:
1. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(1970);92
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation (197 1);9'
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons (1973); 9 4
4. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980); 9
5
5. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979);96
6. Airports Protocol to the Montreal Convention (1988); 97
7. Unlawful Acts Against Maritime Navigation (1988); 98
91. For an in-depth discussion of the coordination of national security policy among
multiple states, see Amos N. Guiora, International Cooperation in Homeland Security
(Univ. of Utah S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 057-08-09, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-- 160067.
92. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,
22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
93. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 178.
94. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035
U.N.T.S. 167.
95. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124.
96. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.1.A.S.
No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
97. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No.
100-19, 27 I.L.M. 627.
98. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Maritime Navigation,
Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221.
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8. Unlawful Acts Against Fixed Platforms (1988); 99
9. Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1998);10 and
10. Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
(1999).101
With some minor alterations, these treaties have many common
characteristics. In general, each treaty (a) provides for individual
criminal liability for the proscribed acts; 10 2 (b) requires states that are
parties to the treaty to make offenses punishable; 10 3 (c) contains a
"prosecute-or-extradite" regime requiring a party to either prosecute any
alleged offenders over whom they have jurisdiction concerning the
alleged acts or to extradite them to another treaty party that is able to
properly establish jurisdiction and prosecute; 104 and (d) establishes a duty
on all state parties to assist a prosecuting state should they request
help. 105
Let us consider the most recent of these conventions, which is the
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism. 10 6 This convention provides the groundwork for increased
regulatory coordination among member states to track money transfers.
This can be especially useful given the informal transfer methods using
hawallas.
It also allows for accounts to be frozen, which picks away at the
funding links of a terror network.'0 7 While some complain that the
amount of money blocked in the bank accounts of, for example, the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards, is small, "this view fails to put financial
warfare in a strategic context. Blocking bank accounts of key groups and
individuals puts the spotlight on them and thereby increases the risks to
99. Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304.
100. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res.
52/164, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (Jan. 9, 1998) [hereinafter Bombings Convention].
101. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A.
Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999) [hereinafter Financing
Convention]. For a more comprehensive list of anti-terrorism treaties, see generally M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937-
2001) (2001).
102. See, e.g., Bombings Convention, supra note 100, art. 4.
103. See, e.g., id
104. See, e.g., id. art. 6.
105. See, e.g., id. art. 10.
106. Financing Convention, supra note 101.
107. See id. art. 8.
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any company or government doing business with them." 10 8 In other
words, it degrades the links of the network. "In many respects,
conventional economic warfare is like carpet bombing; financial warfare
is like [a] precision strike."' 0 9  While globalization facilitates the
anonymous funding of terrorists, it also provides means to attack terrorist
financing."0  Such regulatory coordination, when combined with the
insights of network theory, can be an effective tool:
When combined with advances in social network mapping,
[financial warfare] can give a highly detailed picture of an elite's
communication and financial structure that can be used for
targeting....
Watching how money flows out of a country in a crisis can be an
important tip-off to who is in the know and who is at least
partially responsible for national decisions."'
Besides assisting in government coordination, the network of anti-
terrorism laws also pluralizes enforcement.
First, the "prosecute-or-extradite" norm widens the number of states
that can prosecute a suspected terrorist for a specific act. Normally, one
would expect that prosecution would come from a state that had a direct
link to the event, such as having the crime take place within its
jurisdiction or having one of its nationals killed. But, under the
prosecute-or-extradite norm, a suspected terrorist may be prosecuted by
any state party to the relevant treaty. So, for example, any state party to
the Hijacking Convention can prosecute a suspected hijacker if the states
with the most immediate link choose not (or are unable) to do so. This
norm approximates universal jurisdiction, at least among the state
parties.
Various domestic laws further pluralize enforcement by allowing
private individuals to not only sue suspected terrorists, but also the states
that support them. 12 In certain ways, this melding of private action with
108. Paul Bracken, Financial Warfare, FOREIGN POL'Y RES. INST., Sept. 2007,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200709.bracken.financialwarfare.html.
109. Id.
110. Thr se Delpech, The Imbalance of Terror, in THE BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND
MINDS: USING SOFT POWER TO UNDERMINE TERRORIST NETWORKS, supra note 42, at 65,
71.
111. Bracken, supra note 108.
112. See Sean D. Murphy, State Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Immunities, 94 AM. J.
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public purpose is similar to the "private attorney general" model of
securities enforcement and antitrust regulation. The most common form
of suit is a tort suit against an alleged terrorist. Even if the plaintiff wins,
it may be largely a moral victory as it may be very difficult to find any
assets of the defendant's to attach for satisfaction of the judgment.
This concern may be one of the driving reasons behind legislation
that has enabled suits directly against states that are alleged sponsors of
terrorism. Normally, states would be immune from the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts. However, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA) 1 3 amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act"14 to
permit a claimant who alleged state-supported terrorism to execute a
judgment against property owned by that state that is used for a
commercial activity within the United States." 5
While these legal regimes that broaden the scope of who may
enforce counterterrorism norms essentially expand the counterterrorism
network, some of them do so at a significant price. For example, the
attachment of diplomatic assets in a private suit can call into question the
ability of the United States to fulfill its obligations under the U.S.-Iran
Claims Tribunal, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 16 and
the United Nations Headquarters Agreement.' 17
IV. THE NETWORK OF LAW AND THE WAR ON TERROR
Law's network-the panoply of domestic and international law that
coordinates regulation, assists law enforcement cooperation, and
multilateralizes enforcement-is itself a critical part of the larger
counterterrorism network, which is properly understood as a network of
networks. Unfortunately, recent pronouncements have treated
international law as hampering U.S. policy at best, and as a weapon
INT'LL. 117, 117-18 (2000).
113. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Star. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
114. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2006)).
115. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 221, 110 Stat. at 1241-43. See
also Murphy, supra note 112, at 117.
116. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
117. Murphy, supra note 112, at 124. See also Agreement Between the United Nations
and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations,
U.S.-U.N., June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 3416.
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against U.S. interests at worst. For example, the 2005 National Defense
Strategy warned that "Our strength as a nation state will continue to be
challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using
international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.""' 8  Some U.S.
commentators have started using the term "lawfare" to describe law
being used as a weapon, often against America.' 19 Rather than viewing
the rule of law as an asset, it has suddenly become characterized as a
liability.
And yet, in 4GW, the rule of law, both domestic and international, is
one of our greatest strengths. Unlike previous generations, guerilla
conflicts are, in the words of John Robb, "primarily moral conflicts"
where "[t]he key is maintaining moral cohesion."'12  Referring to the
arguments of Israeli military strategist Martin van Creveld, Robb
explains the dilemma of a democracy embroiled in a 4GW conflict:
[W]hen the strong are seen beating the weak (knocking down
doors, roughing up people of interest, and shooting ragtag
guerillas), they are considered to be barbarians. This view,
amplified by the media, will eventually eat away at the state's
ability to maintain moral cohesion and drastically damage its
global image.
As the state's soldiers continue to fight weak foes, they will
eventually become as ill disciplined and vicious as the people
they are fighting, due to frustration and mirror imaging ....
Citizens lose their feeling of solidarity with the goals of their
government when they perceive it to be acting immorally.
12
'
One of the most dangerous effects of terrorism is thus not the
destruction of the actual attack or the fear of the general populace, but
the withering away of liberal democracies into knee-jerk police states
due to their over-reactions. Far from enhancing the security of their
citizens, police states do not generate more reliable intelligence, they
reduce domestic and international moral cohesion, and they often run
118. DEP'T. OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (2005),
available at http://www.defenselink.miI/news/Mar2005/d200503l8nds2.pdf.
119. Phillip Carter, Legal Combat: Are Enemies Waging War in Our Courts?, SLATE,
Apr. 4, 2005, http://slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id/2116169.
120. ROBB, supra note 1, at 27.
121. Id. at 28-29.
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afoul of global opinion.122 In short, such police states breed more fear
and discontent at home, as well as hamper cooperation abroad.
There has been no evidence shown that the repudiation or
reinterpretation of our international legal obligations, the weakening of
constitutional protections against torture, widespread domestic
wiretapping, or lengthy detention without trial have enhanced our
security in a meaningful way. 123 While it is true that we have not
suffered a major attack since September 11, there is no evidence that a
major attack was prevented by one of these techniques of questionable
legality. To the other extent, these techniques have worn away at our
constitutional protections, have driven deep wedges into our political
culture, and have undermined some of our most important diplomatic
relationships.
Some would respond that such measures are only necessary for the
duration of the conflict. But how shall we know that this war is at an
end? We cannot expect the eradication of all terrorism. The answer
heard most often is that the war will be over when the threat from al
Qaeda is extinguished. But this is a bit of linguistic sleight-of-hand. Al
Qaeda as we knew it is largely gone. Much, if not most, of its original
senior leadership has been killed and its original bases have been
destroyed. But al Qaeda 2.0 lives on, and when one understands the
nature of terror networks, it is likely that some type of entity named al
Qaeda may exist for quite a long time. What we now call al Qaeda is
often comprised of people who began their activities after September 11,
and with little direct link to bin Laden. It is a mushrooming of new cells
with similar goals and symbols, each of which can act as a node in a
broader network. Al Qaeda is becoming more of the rallying cry of a
movement than a single coherent organization.
The problem is that the foe we are fighting-a transnational terror
network-is not a state, and so the normal signifiers of the end of a
war-peace treaties, summit conferences, and the like-simply do not
apply here. Fourth generation warfare may seem new, but some old
verities apply. Despite new technology, it is a conflict where the
psychological aspect is central, and where it is important that we not be
seen as jettisoning who we are simply because of who we fight.
Consequently, the rule of law is vital in this twilight struggle because it
122. Id. at 156-57.
123. See Kelly Ann Moore, Op-Ed., Take Al Qaeda to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2007, at 19 (explaining the strengths of federal courts in anti-terrorism cases).
[Vol. 33
A Tale of Two Networks
helps define who we are by what we fight for. It helps maintain the
moral cohesion that we need in order to prevail in a 4GW conflict. And,
notwithstanding claims that it is necessary to rewrite our constitutional
order and reject our international obligations (based on evidence that we
cannot be allowed to see), it is poor strategic thinking to sell short the
network of law.
International terrorism does not threaten the very survival of our
country. However, the idea of America can die a sort of death by a
thousand self-inflicted cuts in which we continually slice away at some
basic part of who we are in reaction to various threats and stresses. This
is one of the insights of the theories of 4GW and yet, somehow, it is the
key lesson that the Bush Administration had missed.
24
"The key factors that spawned international terrorism show no signs
of abating over the next [ten to] fifteen years."' 125 In the coming years,
"[w]eak governments, lagging economies, religious extremism, and
youth bulges will align to create a perfect storm for internal conflict in
certain regions.' '126 Victory in the struggle against terrorism "will come
not when Washington and its allies kill or capture all terrorists or
potential terrorists but when the ideology the terrorists espouse is
discredited, when their tactics are seen to have failed, and when they
come to find more promising paths to the dignity, respect, and
opportunities they crave."'
' 27
In this regard, fostering the rule of law in the societies that are the
breeding grounds for terrorism is important. But, in order to do that,
supporting the rule of law within and among our own societies is a
necessary step.
124. For two recent critiques of the Bush Administration's treatment of international
law within the "War on Terror," see TOM FARER, CONFRONTING GLOBAL TERRORISM AND
AMERICAN NEO-CONSERVATIVISM: THE FRAMEWORK OF A LIBERAL GRAND STRATEGY
(2008); PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF
GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR's ATLANTIC CHARTER TO GEORGE W. BUSH'S ILLEGAL WAR
223-39 (2005). But cf BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF
JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2008) (arguing that September 11 has led to a
foundational moment in which we must re-balance the relationship of civil liberties and
national security to address the new threats of transnational terrorism).
125. 2020 PROJECT, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, MAPPING THE GLOBAL FUTURE:
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL'S 2020 PROJECT BASED ON
CONSULTATIONS WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS AROUND THE WORLD 15 (2004),
available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf,
126. Id. at 14.
127. Gordon, supra note 34.
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V. CONCLUSION
Understanding the phenomenon of terrorism in the early twenty-first
century requires an appreciation of how networks operate. Terrorist
organizations more than ever are organized as non-hierarchical,
scattered-cluster networks.
The targets of terrorist networks are the very infrastructure of
modem industrial societies: electrical grids, oil pipelines, and the World
Wide Web. Terrorist networks seek to weaken states by crashing the
networks upon which states rely.
In response to these threats, states have created a variety of policies
ranging from military invasion, to intelligence operations, to law
enforcement investigations. However, of the various tools at its disposal,
the Bush Administration had been wary, if not hostile, to using the
network of transnational law to respond to the network of terrorists.
Non-hierarchical international networks defy a unilateral response.
There is no single country that can be invaded to crash the whole
network. There is no single person to capture or kill. Rather, key nodes
throughout the network have to be disabled and linkages have to be cut.
This requires a coordinated, multilateral response. The web of anti-
terrorism treaties have provided the groundwork for policy and law
enforcement coordination.
It is important that the right nodes are attacked. This will require
good intelligence. While network theory proposes some possibilities
regarding information acquisition-such as broadening the scope of
phone and e-mail surveillance and cross-referencing the results-there
are serious civil liberty concerns. But network theory also provides
insights as to the process of intelligence analysis that may lead to better
collaboration and more accurate reports that can serve in our efforts to
frustrate or destroy terrorist organizations.
However, it is important to keep in mind that the goal of al Qaeda,
and of groups like it, is to sap our strength and fray our social cohesion.
For these reasons, a crucial part of the network of law is not only the
laws that enable us to strike at the terrorists, but also those laws that
protect our way of life, our freedoms, and our liberties. While times of
conflict often cause a certain rebalancing of the relationship of individual
rights to national security, it is vital to keep in mind that such rebalancing
should be as a small as possible. If we change who we are, then we have
handed the terrorist what they want.
The network of laws should not be understood, in the words of the
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Department of Defense, as "a strategy of the weak." Rather, it is the
shield that protects our society both from the terrorists and from our own
worst inclinations.

